收稿日期: 2003-05-29
网络出版日期: 2003-07-10
基金资助
国家重点基础研究发展规划项目 (G1999035802);国家杰出青年科学基金项目 (60025205,60273027)资助
Survey on Theories and Methods of Formal Analyses for Security Protocols
Received date: 2003-05-29
Online published: 2003-07-10
冯登国 , 范红 . 安全协议形式化分析理论与方法研究综述[J]. 中国科学院大学学报, 2003 , 20(4) : 389 -406 . DOI: 10.7523/j.issn.2095-6134.2003.4.001
Theories and methods of formal analyses for security protocol are surveyed.A classfication and a system model of formal analyses is given, and three classes of formal analy sis methods(based on reasoning,based on attack, based on proof)and fo rmal languages used in formal analyses are commented in details.Also disscussed is a new challenge the methods of security pro tocol formal analy sis are facing. Corresponding comments on these theories and methods are also given during the discussion.Challenges formal analyses face are also proposed.
Key words: security protocol; security model; formal analysis; formal language
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