收稿日期: 2009-11-18
修回日期: 2010-03-04
网络出版日期: 2010-07-15
基金资助
Supported by National 863 Hight-tech Research Development Program of China (2006AA01Z451, 2007AA010505, and 2009AA01Z432)
Enforcement of Clark-Wilson model in combination of RBAC and TE models
Received date: 2009-11-18
Revised date: 2010-03-04
Online published: 2010-07-15
Supported by
Supported by National 863 Hight-tech Research Development Program of China (2006AA01Z451, 2007AA010505, and 2009AA01Z432)
提出通过融合RBAC和TE模型来实现Clark-Wilson模型的一种方法,即:通过不同用户赋予不同角色实现责任分立;利用特殊的域表示变换过程;使用不同的类型标识约束数据项和非约束数据项. 分析了实施和认证规则的正确性. 通过在SEBSD系统中实施了FTP的完整性安全策略的实例,说明该方法能够实现细粒度的访问控制和灵活配置.
关键词： 安全操作系统; Clark-Wilson模型; RBAC模型; TE模型
袁春阳 , 邓晨蕾 . 通过RBAC和TE模型融合实现Clark-Wilson模型[J]. 中国科学院大学学报, 2010 , 27(4) : 538 -546 . DOI: 10.7523/j.issn.2095-6134.2010.4.016
An approach to enforce Clark-Wilson model in the combination of RBAC and TE models is presented, namely: separation of duties is addressed by assigning different roles to different users; special domains are used for representing transformation procedures; and the constrained data items and unconstrained data items are labeled with different types. The correctness of the enforcement and certification rules is analyzed. A detailed case study of FTP integrity policy is implemented under SEBSD, and shows that the approach achieves fine-grained access control and flexible configuration.
Key words： secure operating system; Clark-Wilson; RBAC; type enforcement
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