针对密码模块API的形式化验证,提出一种基于项重写形式化模型的检测算法. 该算法利用符号化及广度优先搜索方法,使用项重写规则对敌手的初始知识集不断进行匹配和扩展,直到找到攻击路径或者搜索完状态空间. 以密码模块API标准PKCS#11为例具体实现了该检测算法,通过5个实验完成了对PKCS#11对称密钥管理部分API的形式化验证. 实验结果表明,该方法能有效检测针对PKCS#11的攻击,并找到一个新的攻击序列.
For the formal verification of the cryptographic module API, a security analysis algorithm using term rewriting system was proposed. The term rewriting rules were used to extend the intruder's knowledge with breadth-first search and symbolic method. The search will stop until an attack path has been found or all the finite state space has been searched. The algorithm was applied to PKCS#11 which is an API standard for the cryptographic module, and five experiments were performed to complete the formal verification of the symmetric key management API commands of PKCS#11. The experimental results showed that the algorithm detected the attacks against PKCS#11 precisely and effectively, and also a new API attack sequence was discovered.
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