收稿日期: 2002-06-12
修回日期: 2002-09-16
网络出版日期: 2003-05-10
基金资助
国家自然科学基金项目(1993 10 10 )
A Kind of Electronic Elimination Auction Without Auctioneers
Received date: 2002-06-12
Revised date: 2002-09-16
Online published: 2003-05-10
张键红 , 王育民 . 一种淘汰式无拍卖行的电子拍卖[J]. 中国科学院大学学报, 2003 , 20(3) : 358 -362 . DOI: 10.7523/j.issn.2095-6134.2003.3.016
There is a common flaw in all the sealed-bid, that is a tie.Tie appears when two or more bidders choose the same highest price in a round.Because of the tie, the efficiency of auction is influenced seriously.The author presents an Electronic elimination auction which is based on Shamir's (t, n)-threshold system.In this kind of auction there is no auctioneer and bids are shared among bidders in order to realize the bids'anonymity.Meanwhile the author gives a kind of elimination auction to solve tie, so that the efficiency of auction is greatly raised
Key words： elimination auction; anonymity; super-increasing sequence; tie
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