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基于演化博弈的数据交易模式选择策略研究*

郝俊1,2, 穆梦迪2, 李建平2,†   

  1. 1 中国科学院计算机网络信息中心,北京 100083;
    2 中国科学院大学经济与管理学院,北京 100190
  • 收稿日期:2025-08-01 修回日期:2026-01-22 发布日期:2026-01-23
  • 通讯作者: † E-mail:ljp@ucas.ac.cn
  • 基金资助:
    *国家自然科学基金重大课题(T2293774)、国家自然科学基金面上项目(72571269)和国家自然科学基金青年项目(72201265)资助

Selection strategy for data trading models based on dynamic evolutionary game

HAO Jun1,2, MU Mengdi2, LI Jianping2   

  1. 1. Computer Network Information Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100083, China;
    2 School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
  • Received:2025-08-01 Revised:2026-01-22 Published:2026-01-23

摘要: 针对数据场内交易与场外流通不平衡问题,研究聚焦数据交易平台引导策略与政府奖惩机制的协同作用,揭示供需双方交易模式选择的内在机制。为此,构建由数据供给方、需求方、交易平台与政府组成的四方演化博弈模型分析其响应逻辑及均衡策略的形成,并结合交易所与政策数据开展行为演化仿真与路径评估。研究结果发现:1)政府政策导向与监管力度促使平台采取积极引导策略,并通过激励机制放大对交易双方的影响,从而提升场内交易量。随着激励成本和财政压力上升,政府会从高强度激励转向惩罚约束与低激励并行的协同调控模式。2)财政补贴、平台激励与惩罚强度同时超过响应阈值时,方能实现平台积极引导、交易双方选择场内交易、政府持续高监管的最优策略组合。3)差异化激励是提升平台引导效能的关键;惩罚机制促进平台行为收敛;财政补偿促使供给方承担合规成本。

关键词: 数据交易, 场内交易, 场外流通, 演化博弈, 模式选择

Abstract: Addressing the imbalance between on-exchange data trading and off-exchange circulation, this study investigates the synergistic effects of platform guidance strategies and governmental incentive-penalty mechanisms. A quadripartite evolutionary game model-comprising data suppliers, data users, trading platforms, and governmental entities-is constructed to analyze strategic response mechanisms and equilibrium formation, complemented by behavioral evolution simulations using data exchange and policy records. Key findings include: 1) Government policy orientation and regulatory intensity encourage platforms to adopt proactive guidance strategies, strengthening their influence on trading parties and increasing on-exchange transactions. Rising incentive costs and fiscal pressure drive government intervention toward a coordinated regime combining penalties with lower-intensity incentives. 2) Optimal strategy portfolios (platform proactivity, on-exchange participation, sustained high-regulation) emerge only when fiscal subsidies, platform incentives, and penalty thresholds collectively surpass behavioral response thresholds. 3) Differential incentives enhance platform guidance, penalties support compliance, and fiscal compensation helps suppliers internalize compliance costs.

Key words: data transaction, on-exchange trading, off-exchange circulation, evolutionary game, mode selection

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