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中国科学院大学学报 ›› 2006, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (2): 257-262.DOI: 10.7523/j.issn.2095-6134.2006.2.034

• 简报 • 上一篇    下一篇

XOR-MAC消息认证码的安全性新证明

王大印; 林东岱; 吴文玲; 姜中华   

  1. 中国科学院软件所,信息安全国家重点实验室,北京,100080
  • 收稿日期:1900-01-01 修回日期:1900-01-01 发布日期:2006-03-15

A New Security Analysis for XOR Message Authentication Code

WANG Da-Yin, LIN Dong-Dai, WU Wen-Ling, JIANG Zhong-Hua   

  1. State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software,
    Chinese Academy of Science, Beijing, 100080, P.R.China
  • Received:1900-01-01 Revised:1900-01-01 Published:2006-03-15

摘要: 消息认证码(Message Authentication Codes---MACs)是保证消息完整性的重要工具。Bellare 等人提出了称为XOR-MAC的消息认证码,界定了攻击者成功伪造的概率,从而证明了其安全性,但是他们给出的证明方法较为复杂。本文使用Game-Playing 技术采用新的安全性定义证明了XOR-MAC的安全性,证明方法简单明了;在底层所使用的分组密码是伪随机置换的假设下,量化了该消息认证码与随机函数之间区分的概率。

关键词: 消息认证码, 伪随机函数, 分组密码

Abstract: Message Authentication Codes are very important tools to protect data integrity. XOR-MAC is defined by Bellare, which also give a security analysis for it. But security analysis for XOR-MAC they gave is complex. In this paper, we use Game-Playing technique to give a new security analysis for XOR-MAC. We prove XOR-MAC secure, quantifying an adversary’s success probability of distinguishing XOR-MAC from purely random function in terms of the quality of the block cipher as a pseudorandom permutation.

Key words: Message Authentication Code, Pseudo-random Functions, Block Ciphers

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