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Rational secret sharing protocol in the context of extensive game with imperfect information
Received date: 2012-09-24
Revised date: 2013-01-07
Online published: 2013-07-15
We investigate the incredible threat issue caused by players' sequential actions in a rational secret sharing protocol. We propose a general rational secret sharing protocol satisfying k-resilient (m,n) Nash equilibrium which eliminates incredible threat. In our protocol, when some player deviates from the equilibrium, other players do not choose to abort but instead they continuously punish the deviator in enough runs. We do not need online distributor in our protocol but instead we use the negotiated random numbers by participants to update shares.
Key words： secret sharing; game theory; extensive game; sequential equilibrium
SUN Fu-Ling , ZHOU Zhan-Fei , YU Yang . Rational secret sharing protocol in the context of extensive game with imperfect information[J]. Journal of University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2013 , 30(4) : 539 -546 . DOI: 10.7523/j.issn.2095-6134.2013.04.016
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