Journal of University of Chinese Academy of Sciences >
Optimal Level of Self-Organized Segregation of Evolutionary Minority Game
Received date: 2002-03-25
Revised date: 2002-05-16
Online published: 2003-03-10
The evolutionary minority game by imitating neighbor's p value is investigated. We allow the agent to modify her p value after imitation. Numerical results show that there exists an optimal level of correlation between the agent's new p value and her neighbor's p value after imitation, at which the agents evolve into a state in which they self-segregate into nearly equal-sized opposing groups characterized by extreme behavior.The evolution by imitation can considerably enhances the system's coordination.
Key words： minority game; imitation; evolution
Quan Hongjun , Wang Binhong , Luo Xiaoshu . Optimal Level of Self-Organized Segregation of Evolutionary Minority Game[J]. Journal of University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2003 , 20(2) : 191 -195 . DOI: 10.7523/j.issn.2095-6134.2003.2.011
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