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A Kind of Electronic Elimination Auction Without Auctioneers

  • ZHANG JianHong ,
  • WANG YuMin
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  • National Key Lab of Integrated Service Net Works, Xian University, Xian 710071, China

Received date: 2002-06-12

  Revised date: 2002-09-16

  Online published: 2003-05-10

Abstract

There is a common flaw in all the sealed-bid, that is a tie.Tie appears when two or more bidders choose the same highest price in a round.Because of the tie, the efficiency of auction is influenced seriously.The author presents an Electronic elimination auction which is based on Shamir's (t, n)-threshold system.In this kind of auction there is no auctioneer and bids are shared among bidders in order to realize the bids'anonymity.Meanwhile the author gives a kind of elimination auction to solve tie, so that the efficiency of auction is greatly raised

Cite this article

ZHANG JianHong , WANG YuMin . A Kind of Electronic Elimination Auction Without Auctioneers[J]. Journal of University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2003 , 20(3) : 358 -362 . DOI: 10.7523/j.issn.2095-6134.2003.3.016

References

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[5] M Kudo.Secure electroni c sealed-bid auction protocol with publi c key cryptography.IEICE Trans Fundamentals.1998, E81-A(1):20 ~ 27

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