In order to suppress the village committees' rent-seeking behavior effectively, this study establishes a supervision game model between the local supervisory authorities and village committees, and analyzes the factors that affect the rent-seeking and supervising behavior of rural collective management land in China. The results show that the probability of selecting a rent-seeking strategy by the village committees is affected by the cost of the local supervisory authority, the probability of strict supervision, the probability of detection (the probability of no strict monitor), and the effects of distortion and punishment. The probability of strict monitor by the local supervisory authorities is affected by the probability of detection (the probability of no strict monitor/strict monitor) and the punishment. Therefore, this study suggests that a combination model of national and social supervision is needed to smooth the channels of public supervision and reduce the monitoring cost of the local supervisory authorities. At the same time, the network monitoring should be improved by the national administrative legislation. Finally, the punishment from the political and economic aspects should be strengthened.
LIU Jingyu
,
YIN Qi
,
TANG Hong
,
ZHANG Zhan
. A supervisory game model for village committees' behavior in the marketilization of rural commercial collective-owned construction land[J]. Journal of University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2018
, 35(6)
: 805
-813
.
DOI: 10.7523/j.issn.2095-6134.2018.06.012
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