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中国科学院大学学报 ›› 2003, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (2): 191-195.DOI: 10.7523/j.issn.2095-6134.2003.2.011

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

模仿经纪人演化少数者博奕模型中的合作效应

全宏俊1,2, 汪秉宏1, 罗晓曙1,3   

  1. 1. 中国科学技术大学近代物理系及非线性科学中心, 合肥 230026;
    2. 华南理工大学应用物理系, 广州 510641;
    3. 广西师范大学物理与电子科学系, 桂林 541004
  • 收稿日期:2002-03-25 修回日期:2002-05-16 发布日期:2003-03-10
  • 基金资助:

    国家重点基础研究发展规划项目(973 计划专项经费), 国家自然科学基金(19932020,19974039和 70271070), 中国加拿大大学与工业联合基金(CCUIPP-NSFC70142005)和广西自然科学基金资助(0135063)项目

Optimal Level of Self-Organized Segregation of Evolutionary Minority Game

Quan Hongjun1,2, Wang Binhong1, Luo Xiaoshu1,3   

  1. 1. Department of Modern Physics and Nonlinear Science Center, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China;
    2. Department of Applied Physics, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510641, China;
    3. Department of Physics and Electronic Science, Guangxi Normal University, Guilin 541004, China
  • Received:2002-03-25 Revised:2002-05-16 Published:2003-03-10

摘要:

提出并研究了一种新的演化少数者博弈模型.在该模型中.每个经纪人有一个几率p值.在给定m比特下,每个经纪人以几率p选择去最近相同m比特历史下的取胜方,以几率1-p作出相反的决定,同时经纪人可以模仿财富高于自己的最近邻邻居的p值并加以修正,数值模拟结果显示,经纪人的新几率p和他最佳邻

关键词: 争当少数者博弈模型, 模仿, 演化

Abstract:

The evolutionary minority game by imitating neighbor's p value is investigated. We allow the agent to modify her p value after imitation. Numerical results show that there exists an optimal level of correlation between the agent's new p value and her neighbor's p value after imitation, at which the agents evolve into a state in which they self-segregate into nearly equal-sized opposing groups characterized by extreme behavior.The evolution by imitation can considerably enhances the system's coordination.

Key words: minority game, imitation, evolution

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